If you were scammed recently with a money order, the counterfeit might have been an instrument spoofing the MoneyGram brand. These money orders have been known to appear in all the too good to be true/don’t exactly make sense come-ons being passed by spam e-mails or via a direct solicitation in a chat room.
In case you are not familiar with all the variations of these come-ons, they include , but aren't limited to (new lures surface frequently), the secret shopper, romance, lottery, work-at-home and auction scams.
The common denominator in most of the scams is there will be a request to send the money you receive via wire transfer (if you don’t get caught), to the fraudster sending you this garbage for a small cut of the total amount. That is unless they are buying goods from you. In this case, the item you are selling is what they want.
In the past, a simple call to MoneyGram’s verification line (1-800-542-3490) normally was all that was needed to reveal the fact that the item was fraudulent. Unfortunately, this is no longer the case. The criminals producing these instruments are now taking advantage of a flaw in the automated verification system, which is tricking people into believing that the money orders are good.
When a MoneyGram money order is called in for verification, the system prompts the user to enter all the particulars of the instrument, including the serial number and dollar amount. If the system doesn’t spot a discrepancy, it gives out a standard disclaimer stating there are no stops or holds on the item. If the system catches a discrepancy, it directs the caller to a live operator during their business hours.
In recent weeks, I’ve received reports of this being exploited in two ways. In the first instance – a legitimate money order is purchased for a small amount (normally $1.00) –then is chemically washed and altered to reflect a large dollar amount. It is then passed before it registers in the verification system – and since the system doesn’t recognize the dollar amount – it gives out the standard disclaimer that tells the caller there are no stops or holds on the item. According to the people, I’ve asked, money orders do not register in the system for anywhere between 24 and 96 hours after being issued by a MoneyGram agent.
In these instances, since the item was printed on actual paper, it contains all the known security features. These include a heat sensitive circle, which changes color when rubbed.
A second variation of this scam has also been seen. In this variation, the instrument is a copy of a money order purchased for a small dollar amount. These will pass muster in the system as described above, but the security features will not be present. In this second version of the scam, the dates were printed to make it appear as if the item had been purchased several weeks before the legitimate item actually was. I suspect this was to trick people, who had already discovered the "washed instrument" mutation of this scam.
When I first started getting reports on these variations of the scam, I thought it might be only targeting a limited geographical area. Normally when washing items occurs, this is the case. Since then, I've discovered this is happening throughout North America and the items are being shipped using overnight services, such as Federal Express and UPS.
I have also had reports that these are being passed not only via online come-ons, but also by professional groups who specialize in passing counterfeit instruments.
I went to the MoneyGram site to see if there were any warnings about this specific scam and found none. They do have a consumer protection area on their site, which refers to all the come-ons to trick people to cash these items. They also have information on how to verify their product in the FAQ area for customers on their site.
The sad fact is that money order companies do not take a loss on these instruments. When the items is discovered to be a fraud – they return it to the institution who cashed it and the institution goes after (if they can find them) – the person who cashed them. With any money order, it is nearly impossible to be made whole by the issuing company, itself. In fact, many experts will tell you that accepting a money order is more risky than accepting a personal check. If you listen to the disclaimer on the verification line it tells you exactly that.
So far as getting these instruments in too good to be true online scams – with the sour economy – I am seeing more and more people who really want to believe they have come into a financial windfall. When they fall for these scams – one thing is for certain – which are they are going to be held liable for cashing the items when the scam is discovered. This will certainly include being held financially liable, but can also mean facing criminal charges.
So far as counterfeit MoneyGram instruments – although a lot of them seem to be out there – they are not the only items being counterfeited. U.S. Postal Money Orders have been seen frequently in the past, too. Recently, the U.S. Postal Service redesigned their product and has a new page on their site to help consumers verify their product. Counterfeit cashier's checks, money orders, gift and travelers cheques are also known to be frequently counterfeited and used in these types of scams.
If you want to learn more about these scams, I recommend going to fakechecks.org, where you can see some highly visual demonstrations of these schemes. Another good resource on this subject – particularly if you are a victim – is FraudAid. The folks at FraudAid actually provide resources and advocate for people falling for these scams.
Saturday, April 25, 2009
Friday, April 17, 2009
Twin Reports Suggest We are Losing the Cybercrime War
According to Symantec, malicious activity in 2008 amounted to 60 percent of all the activity they have recorded since they started keeping records. Last year, they recorded 1.6 million new malicious code signatures and blocked 245 million malware attacks from their users every month.
Many of these attacks – when the words malware or malicious code are used – are designed to steal information (preferably financial) or take command and control of a computer. Once command and control of a computer is accomplished – it’s called a zombie and networked into a botnet. A botnet works as a super computer and is used to spam the electronic universe. Some of these spam e-mails contain even more malware, which infects more unprotected systems.
In 2008, Symantec saw a 31 percent increase in the number of zombie computers. In 2008, Symantec observed an average of more than 75,000 active bot-infected computers each day, a 31 percent increase from 2007. Symantec's latest report, which covers January to December of 2008, suggests that 90 percent of these attacks are designed to steal information. Attacks using key loggers – which log a computer's keystrokes and send them to the criminals who installed the malicious code – grew from 72 to 76 percent of the activity observed by Symantec's security lab.
Many of these attacks use a technique known as phishing, which is normally delivered in a spam e-mail. Phishing either tricks people into giving up their information (social engineering) or gets them to download malicious code, which makes the process automatic. Last year, Symantec detected 55,389 phishing website hosts, which is where you are sent if you click on a link in a phish-mail. Spoofed financial services companies accounted for 76 percent of these lures compared to 52 percent in 2007.
Spam, which delivers most of this activity, continued to grow, too. This equated to 349.6 billion spam messages in 2008 compared to 119.6 billion spam messages in 2007, which is a 192 percent increase. According to the monthly spam report from Symantec, last month's spam social engineering themes included mortgage rescue, tax season, terror and scareware (fake antivirus solutions) for the much anticipated Conficker worm that was designed to hit on April Fool's Day. Please note that Conficker a.k.a. Downdaup is still a problem, but it didn't spread it's gloom and doom on April 1st to the degree it was expected to.
Cybercriminals have always been quick to exploit the headlines and with the sour economy in the news have been targeting the financial industry. Here also, Symantec saw an increase of personal and financial information being stolen by using financial institutions as bait. In 2008, this amounted to 29 percent of the activity compared to 10 percent in 2007.
In their latest report, Symantec leveraged information from their recent Report on the Underground Economy which points to an organized criminal community that specializes in the sale of stolen personal and financial information. They noted that the economic principle of supply and demand has come into play with this underground economy due to a glut of stolen data – causing prices to go down.
Most of this stolen information is sold in electronic forums, such as websites and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels. These forums enable information to be sold worldwide and make the activity anonymous. Because the activity is anonymous, it is very difficult to investigate or shut-down. Credit cards go anywhere from less than a dollar to about $30 and bank account credentials sell for anywhere from $10 to $100. Much of the cost depends on the perceived value of information and the amount of it, which is purchased.
Symantec isn't the only one releasing a report showing an alarming increase information theft. Verizon just released a report showing that 285 million information records were compromised in 2008, alone. While the Symantec report focuses more on individual attacks, the Verizon report studies the impact large scale attacks on businesses and organizations. When combined, the information in these reports is pretty revealing.
According to the Verizon report, the 285 million records stolen are greater than what was known to be stolen in 2004 to 2007. I say "greater" because I've often speculated that the most valuable information stolen is the data no one knows has been stolen. After information is known to have been stolen, measures are taken to protect it. This makes it useless or at least a lot harder to use.
Recently, underground services have also popped up in these underground forums, which allow information thieves to see if the information they are buying hasn't been compromised (pun intended).
Verizon, who investigated 90 data breaches last year, noted that malware is now being designed to steal debit card and PIN information. The report also breaks down the point of compromise by industry and how the data was breached. For instance, in the past year 93 percent of the activity compromised was at financial institutions. Also cited was that most attacks were accomplished by external entities (73 percent) taking advantage of procedural flaws, but that when the breach was assisted by an insider (20 percent) more data was stolen.
The trend towards compromising debit cards and PINS is likely because these instruments are the quickest route to obtaining cash. Obtaining cash is normally the ultimate goal of an information thief and stolen debit card information accomplishes this with a minimum of effort.
Also covered are breaches caused by partners (32 percent), which are external entities providing services to a business. Please note these percentages add up to more than 100 percent, which means that multiple points of compromise can be attributed to any one incident in some cases.
Both reports are an excellent read and point to the fact that there is a glut of stolen information for sale on the black market, which isn't good news. The fact that more information is being stolen than ever before – even when security procedures are ramped up on a regular basis – is not good news, either.
Perhaps both of these reports suggest the obvious, which is we are not winning the war against cybercrime and the problem is getting worse. Historically, these losses have been written off and the cost is passed to the consumer. With the sour economy and the fact that a lot of the financial industry is already on the brink of bankruptcy, writing off these losses might no longer be a realistic solution.
The reason criminals can easily exploit this information is that we are storing it in too many places that are too easy to access. The reason this has happened is because a lot of people are making a lot of money by using and selling this information. Making the information easy to access makes it easier to make money from it. I'm all for making money, but at what point does it prove to be irresponsible?
No security fix is going to solve this problem without a healthy dose of common sense being infused into the scheme of things!
After all, the economy is already in a lot of trouble because of some of same people making a lot of money, irresponsibly. My guess is we are getting to the point, where we will no longer be able to write-off the cost of being irresponsible to the consumer, as well as, the taxpaying public.
Many of these attacks – when the words malware or malicious code are used – are designed to steal information (preferably financial) or take command and control of a computer. Once command and control of a computer is accomplished – it’s called a zombie and networked into a botnet. A botnet works as a super computer and is used to spam the electronic universe. Some of these spam e-mails contain even more malware, which infects more unprotected systems.
In 2008, Symantec saw a 31 percent increase in the number of zombie computers. In 2008, Symantec observed an average of more than 75,000 active bot-infected computers each day, a 31 percent increase from 2007. Symantec's latest report, which covers January to December of 2008, suggests that 90 percent of these attacks are designed to steal information. Attacks using key loggers – which log a computer's keystrokes and send them to the criminals who installed the malicious code – grew from 72 to 76 percent of the activity observed by Symantec's security lab.
Many of these attacks use a technique known as phishing, which is normally delivered in a spam e-mail. Phishing either tricks people into giving up their information (social engineering) or gets them to download malicious code, which makes the process automatic. Last year, Symantec detected 55,389 phishing website hosts, which is where you are sent if you click on a link in a phish-mail. Spoofed financial services companies accounted for 76 percent of these lures compared to 52 percent in 2007.
Spam, which delivers most of this activity, continued to grow, too. This equated to 349.6 billion spam messages in 2008 compared to 119.6 billion spam messages in 2007, which is a 192 percent increase. According to the monthly spam report from Symantec, last month's spam social engineering themes included mortgage rescue, tax season, terror and scareware (fake antivirus solutions) for the much anticipated Conficker worm that was designed to hit on April Fool's Day. Please note that Conficker a.k.a. Downdaup is still a problem, but it didn't spread it's gloom and doom on April 1st to the degree it was expected to.
Cybercriminals have always been quick to exploit the headlines and with the sour economy in the news have been targeting the financial industry. Here also, Symantec saw an increase of personal and financial information being stolen by using financial institutions as bait. In 2008, this amounted to 29 percent of the activity compared to 10 percent in 2007.
In their latest report, Symantec leveraged information from their recent Report on the Underground Economy which points to an organized criminal community that specializes in the sale of stolen personal and financial information. They noted that the economic principle of supply and demand has come into play with this underground economy due to a glut of stolen data – causing prices to go down.
Most of this stolen information is sold in electronic forums, such as websites and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels. These forums enable information to be sold worldwide and make the activity anonymous. Because the activity is anonymous, it is very difficult to investigate or shut-down. Credit cards go anywhere from less than a dollar to about $30 and bank account credentials sell for anywhere from $10 to $100. Much of the cost depends on the perceived value of information and the amount of it, which is purchased.
Symantec isn't the only one releasing a report showing an alarming increase information theft. Verizon just released a report showing that 285 million information records were compromised in 2008, alone. While the Symantec report focuses more on individual attacks, the Verizon report studies the impact large scale attacks on businesses and organizations. When combined, the information in these reports is pretty revealing.
According to the Verizon report, the 285 million records stolen are greater than what was known to be stolen in 2004 to 2007. I say "greater" because I've often speculated that the most valuable information stolen is the data no one knows has been stolen. After information is known to have been stolen, measures are taken to protect it. This makes it useless or at least a lot harder to use.
Recently, underground services have also popped up in these underground forums, which allow information thieves to see if the information they are buying hasn't been compromised (pun intended).
Verizon, who investigated 90 data breaches last year, noted that malware is now being designed to steal debit card and PIN information. The report also breaks down the point of compromise by industry and how the data was breached. For instance, in the past year 93 percent of the activity compromised was at financial institutions. Also cited was that most attacks were accomplished by external entities (73 percent) taking advantage of procedural flaws, but that when the breach was assisted by an insider (20 percent) more data was stolen.
The trend towards compromising debit cards and PINS is likely because these instruments are the quickest route to obtaining cash. Obtaining cash is normally the ultimate goal of an information thief and stolen debit card information accomplishes this with a minimum of effort.
Also covered are breaches caused by partners (32 percent), which are external entities providing services to a business. Please note these percentages add up to more than 100 percent, which means that multiple points of compromise can be attributed to any one incident in some cases.
Both reports are an excellent read and point to the fact that there is a glut of stolen information for sale on the black market, which isn't good news. The fact that more information is being stolen than ever before – even when security procedures are ramped up on a regular basis – is not good news, either.
Perhaps both of these reports suggest the obvious, which is we are not winning the war against cybercrime and the problem is getting worse. Historically, these losses have been written off and the cost is passed to the consumer. With the sour economy and the fact that a lot of the financial industry is already on the brink of bankruptcy, writing off these losses might no longer be a realistic solution.
The reason criminals can easily exploit this information is that we are storing it in too many places that are too easy to access. The reason this has happened is because a lot of people are making a lot of money by using and selling this information. Making the information easy to access makes it easier to make money from it. I'm all for making money, but at what point does it prove to be irresponsible?
No security fix is going to solve this problem without a healthy dose of common sense being infused into the scheme of things!
After all, the economy is already in a lot of trouble because of some of same people making a lot of money, irresponsibly. My guess is we are getting to the point, where we will no longer be able to write-off the cost of being irresponsible to the consumer, as well as, the taxpaying public.
Saturday, March 28, 2009
Counterfeit Documents Enable Dangerous Criminal Activity
For the past few weeks, the news has focused on all the blood being shed on our southern border. While there is no doubt that this activity is scary and real, these gangs have to be a little more low key when they perform their day-to-day operations.
In order to do this, they need to blend in with the rest of us. When setting up residence to operate their illegal businesses, these criminals need to appear legitimate. The way they do this is with a wide variety of counterfeit documents. These counterfeit documents enable the rest of the illegal activity to occur, which makes them a weapon that could be a lot more dangerous than an assault rifle, IED or RPG.
Although the news media is drawing attention to this problem (yet again) because of the violence on the border, the violence and resulting concerns about border security are nothing new. Neither is the use of counterfeit documents by the criminals crossing over the border and setting up residence in the United States.
A PBS Frontline story from 2001 illustrates the worst case scenario of this problem. It details how terrorists are specifically trained to use counterfeit documents to move across borders. The story states that using counterfeit documents is part of the security training of Al Qaeda operatives. This story also states that the terrorists affiliate themselves with organized criminal syndicates that smuggle humans and provide counterfeit documents to accomplish this.
If an undesirable person has documents that appear to be legitimate, it’s no problem to cross a border or set up residence in a neighborhood just about anywhere.
Because of this, the plea bargain made with Pedro Castorena-Ibarra — who allegedly masterminded the production of high quality counterfeit documents from coast to coast — is an interesting chapter in the long running border security saga. Quite simply, these counterfeit documents enable all kinds of criminal and some say, potential terrorist activity.
At one time, Pedro Castorena-Ibarra was considered one of ICE's most wanted fugitives. A five year investigation uncovered his involvement in the production of millions of counterfeit documents, which were sold to anyone with the money to buy them. The plea bargain stipulates that Castorena will testify against other people in the counterfeit documents trade. When doing the research on this, I noticed that there isn't very much public information on exactly who he is going to testify against.
One of the problems with prosecuting Castorena came about when a lead ICE agent assigned to the case, Cory Voorhis was indicted for using a government intelligence system in an unauthorized manner. While working the Castorena case, Voorhis decided to take a look at former Denver District Attorney Bill Ritter's plea bargains with illegal immigrants.
This information was subsequently used in an attack ad on now Governor Bill Ritter. The specific information used in the ad was about an illegal alien, who received one of these plea bargains after being accused of dealing heroin, and was allowed to plead guilty to trespassing. Voorhis discovered this same illegal immigrant had been previously arrested (but never convicted) on sex charges in California under a different name. How much do you want to bet he had access to counterfeit documents? Ritter called for an investigation and Voorhis ended up getting tried in federal court.
Voorhis was accused of accessing information he wasn't authorized to see in a government database (NCIC), which was later found to be incorrect. The National Crime Information Center is a database maintained by the FBI that records data on crimes. It came out in the trial that he actually used the web based link to this system instead of the TECS (Treasury Enforcement Communication System) that he was accused of accessing. This came out in testimony from a government witness and was corroborated in a FBI forensic analysis of his government computer. Because of this, it was determined that Voorhis never exceeded his authorized level of access.
Additionally, the information he accessed was in the public domain and could probably been found using other tools besides NCIC, some of which are available to anyone.
Voorhis has maintained he was trying to force change in what he considered questionable legal proceedings. There might be a few people out there that agree that it doesn't serve the best interests of justice to allow a heroin dealer to plead guilty to a trespassing charge (?). This person wasn't here legally and we might not even know his true identity.
Voorhis has since lost his job – and despite the outcome of the trial – was not allowed to testify in the Castorena trial. Many believe the attempt to prosecute Voorhis isn't much different than the much more public cases of Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean.
In a recent article, former Congressman Tom Tancredo wrote about this, he points out that it seems to be more dangerous to be a federal officer charged with protecting our borders than to be one of the criminals crossing it. Please note that in the Ramos/Compean case, as well as, the Voorhis case — the immigrants involved were not here to find honest labor. Voorhis has a website, which has a lot of information on this case.
This includes a press release by Congressman Tancredo calling for ICE to give him his job back. The press release points out that the charges against him were found to be incorrect and he was exonerated. This would lead most of us to believe that this is a reasonable request (?). If it only took two hours to acquit Voorhis, there is a pretty good case that the prosecution's evidence in this case was pretty weak (opinion). It’s ironic that the effort to prosecute Castorena was dealt a death blow when Voorhis wasn’t allowed to testify against him even though he was found innocent.
The Voorhis site has an area, where people can donate to help him pay for the considerable legal costs incurred to defend himself. Of course, there might be another reason for making the deal with Castorena. In the world of plea bargains, deals are sometimes made to go after a bigger fish in the pond. Just who Castorena is going to testify against is open to speculation, but it might be against the Leija-Sanchez organization.
The Leija-Sanchez arm of the counterfeit documents trade operated out of the Chicago area and is reputed to be tied in with the Castorena organization. The step-daughter of the boss of this organization (Manuel Leija-Sanchez) has provided a lot of evidence on the scope and wide reach of this organization to the authorities. Please note, that like the drug cartels in the news recently, this cartel has also been found to be capable of violent activity when someone gets in their way.
Suad Leija is the step-daughter of Manuel Leija, who involved her in the counterfeit documents trade from an early age. Suad was recruited by a mysterious gentleman with obvious ties to the intelligence community, who is now her husband. The intent was to leverage the organization to identify potential terrorists, who had used their services.
The deal fell through and Suad headed north to assist the government in identifying the scope of the operation in North America. Since then there a lot of the key players in the organization have been identified and arrested, but the case is ongoing and ICE will not comment on it in public. Saud’s stated motivation in this effort is to prevent terrorists from using these documents to commit harm against the general public.
The Suad Leija story, which has been covered extensively in the mainstream media, is chronicled on her own site, Paper Weapons. If you want to see how widespread the problem of counterfeit documents is, the site is a good place to start. Suad provided a lot of the information, which tied in the Castorena branch with the Leija-Sanchez organization. The ties are pointed out on her site.
Please note that this is a very brief overview of the Suad story and if you are interested, her site covers it in great detail. The problem with counterfeit documents is a tendency to associate them with illegal immigrants trying to make a better life for themselves or teenagers sneaking into bars. The real issue is that they are sold to anyone and used by criminals who have a more sinister intent than to make a better life for themselves or sneak into a bar.
No matter where you stand on the illegal immigrant issue, the fact that the trade is controlled by criminals often leaves those with dreams of a better life open to a wide-array of abuse. This includes being enslaved and forced to commit crimes by the people, who bring them over the border.
Another common misconception is that these documents are being sold exclusively to our Hispanic neighbors to the south. The truth is they are being sold to anyone with the money to buy them. Our southern border has become the preferred route for anyone who wants to illegally enter the United States. All the resources needed to gain entry (illegally) seem to be readily available there.
On Friday, Sara Carter released an article in the Washington Times about the ties between the drug cartels on the border and Hezbollah joining forces to smuggle drugs and humans into the country. Although not mentioned in the story, these people obviously would need documents to set up shop once they cross the border. In fact, in theory at least, they might use them to cross the border.
Because, I found the story interesting, I made contact with Suad Leija’s husband, who told me that he gave this information to Carter a few years ago and pointed out that Lou Dobbs has also covered aspects of this story. Both Carter and Dobbs have covered the Suad story, and interviewed her, personally.
During this conversation, he told me that the specific information given was about an operation he proposed called “Tag.” Tag predated his involvement in the Leija-Sanchez operation and was designed to set up a means to provide documents to people illegally entering the country and then "chip" them so that specific targets could be tracked.
The original intent of the Leija-Sanchez operation was to get the cartel to cooperate in identifying and monitoring potential terrorists coming into the United States, illegally. Tag might have become part of this operation, if it had ever taken place, according to Suad's husband.
He told me the Hezbollah connection was nothing new and confirmed it comes out of the tri-border area in Paraguay, which hosts a large Islamic population. The residents in this area emigrated from Lebanon primarily in the aftermath of 1948 Arab-Israeli and the 1985 Lebanese civil wars.
He also mentioned that, according to Suad, the Islamic immigrants were paying $5,000 each to be brought across the border when the Leija-Sanchez organization was involved. Complete sets of counterfeit documents were included in the deal.
Parts of this story have surfaced before; MSBC did a story on the tri-border area of Paraguay and the Hezbollah connection. This story covers the terrorist financing aspect and potential threat to the United States. Michelle Malkin also did a post on her blog mentioning that FBI director Robert Mueller mentioned Hezbollah members crossing the border in testimony before Congress in 2006. She also mentions Mueller referring to terrorists assuming Hispanic identities and crossing the border, while in Texas in 2007. In October of last year, the Los Angeles Times did a story about Hezbollah laundering the proceeds of Colombian Drug Money. The story mentions that the cocaine being sold was going to the United States and other destinations.
Carter, who covers the border situation on a regular basis, has also done stories on the Mexican military crossing the border in support of drug smugglers and even firing shots at U.S. law enforcement. In one of the stories about this, which I saw on YouTube, Carter stated she got some of this information for the harder working illegal immigrant types. She mentioned that they hide from these groups in order to avoid being victimized by them.
Maybe these hard working illegal types are trying to tell us something?
Even more ominous, was President Obama's recent revelation that Al Qaeda was planning attacks on U.S. soil from their hideouts in the tribal belt in Pakistan. If this is true, the first thing these terrorists will need when they enter our country are counterfeit documents so they can blend in with the rest of us.
If you take a look at any aspect of the insecure situation on our border, counterfeit documents are more than likely involved in one way or another.
After all, it is a known fact that the last time a terrorist attack was carried out on U.S. soil; it was accomplished by individuals who used fake documents to enter the country to commit their dirty deeds on 9-11-2001.
In order to do this, they need to blend in with the rest of us. When setting up residence to operate their illegal businesses, these criminals need to appear legitimate. The way they do this is with a wide variety of counterfeit documents. These counterfeit documents enable the rest of the illegal activity to occur, which makes them a weapon that could be a lot more dangerous than an assault rifle, IED or RPG.
Although the news media is drawing attention to this problem (yet again) because of the violence on the border, the violence and resulting concerns about border security are nothing new. Neither is the use of counterfeit documents by the criminals crossing over the border and setting up residence in the United States.
A PBS Frontline story from 2001 illustrates the worst case scenario of this problem. It details how terrorists are specifically trained to use counterfeit documents to move across borders. The story states that using counterfeit documents is part of the security training of Al Qaeda operatives. This story also states that the terrorists affiliate themselves with organized criminal syndicates that smuggle humans and provide counterfeit documents to accomplish this.
If an undesirable person has documents that appear to be legitimate, it’s no problem to cross a border or set up residence in a neighborhood just about anywhere.
Because of this, the plea bargain made with Pedro Castorena-Ibarra — who allegedly masterminded the production of high quality counterfeit documents from coast to coast — is an interesting chapter in the long running border security saga. Quite simply, these counterfeit documents enable all kinds of criminal and some say, potential terrorist activity.
At one time, Pedro Castorena-Ibarra was considered one of ICE's most wanted fugitives. A five year investigation uncovered his involvement in the production of millions of counterfeit documents, which were sold to anyone with the money to buy them. The plea bargain stipulates that Castorena will testify against other people in the counterfeit documents trade. When doing the research on this, I noticed that there isn't very much public information on exactly who he is going to testify against.
One of the problems with prosecuting Castorena came about when a lead ICE agent assigned to the case, Cory Voorhis was indicted for using a government intelligence system in an unauthorized manner. While working the Castorena case, Voorhis decided to take a look at former Denver District Attorney Bill Ritter's plea bargains with illegal immigrants.
This information was subsequently used in an attack ad on now Governor Bill Ritter. The specific information used in the ad was about an illegal alien, who received one of these plea bargains after being accused of dealing heroin, and was allowed to plead guilty to trespassing. Voorhis discovered this same illegal immigrant had been previously arrested (but never convicted) on sex charges in California under a different name. How much do you want to bet he had access to counterfeit documents? Ritter called for an investigation and Voorhis ended up getting tried in federal court.
Voorhis was accused of accessing information he wasn't authorized to see in a government database (NCIC), which was later found to be incorrect. The National Crime Information Center is a database maintained by the FBI that records data on crimes. It came out in the trial that he actually used the web based link to this system instead of the TECS (Treasury Enforcement Communication System) that he was accused of accessing. This came out in testimony from a government witness and was corroborated in a FBI forensic analysis of his government computer. Because of this, it was determined that Voorhis never exceeded his authorized level of access.
Additionally, the information he accessed was in the public domain and could probably been found using other tools besides NCIC, some of which are available to anyone.
Voorhis has maintained he was trying to force change in what he considered questionable legal proceedings. There might be a few people out there that agree that it doesn't serve the best interests of justice to allow a heroin dealer to plead guilty to a trespassing charge (?). This person wasn't here legally and we might not even know his true identity.
Voorhis has since lost his job – and despite the outcome of the trial – was not allowed to testify in the Castorena trial. Many believe the attempt to prosecute Voorhis isn't much different than the much more public cases of Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean.
In a recent article, former Congressman Tom Tancredo wrote about this, he points out that it seems to be more dangerous to be a federal officer charged with protecting our borders than to be one of the criminals crossing it. Please note that in the Ramos/Compean case, as well as, the Voorhis case — the immigrants involved were not here to find honest labor. Voorhis has a website, which has a lot of information on this case.
This includes a press release by Congressman Tancredo calling for ICE to give him his job back. The press release points out that the charges against him were found to be incorrect and he was exonerated. This would lead most of us to believe that this is a reasonable request (?). If it only took two hours to acquit Voorhis, there is a pretty good case that the prosecution's evidence in this case was pretty weak (opinion). It’s ironic that the effort to prosecute Castorena was dealt a death blow when Voorhis wasn’t allowed to testify against him even though he was found innocent.
The Voorhis site has an area, where people can donate to help him pay for the considerable legal costs incurred to defend himself. Of course, there might be another reason for making the deal with Castorena. In the world of plea bargains, deals are sometimes made to go after a bigger fish in the pond. Just who Castorena is going to testify against is open to speculation, but it might be against the Leija-Sanchez organization.
The Leija-Sanchez arm of the counterfeit documents trade operated out of the Chicago area and is reputed to be tied in with the Castorena organization. The step-daughter of the boss of this organization (Manuel Leija-Sanchez) has provided a lot of evidence on the scope and wide reach of this organization to the authorities. Please note, that like the drug cartels in the news recently, this cartel has also been found to be capable of violent activity when someone gets in their way.
Suad Leija is the step-daughter of Manuel Leija, who involved her in the counterfeit documents trade from an early age. Suad was recruited by a mysterious gentleman with obvious ties to the intelligence community, who is now her husband. The intent was to leverage the organization to identify potential terrorists, who had used their services.
The deal fell through and Suad headed north to assist the government in identifying the scope of the operation in North America. Since then there a lot of the key players in the organization have been identified and arrested, but the case is ongoing and ICE will not comment on it in public. Saud’s stated motivation in this effort is to prevent terrorists from using these documents to commit harm against the general public.
The Suad Leija story, which has been covered extensively in the mainstream media, is chronicled on her own site, Paper Weapons. If you want to see how widespread the problem of counterfeit documents is, the site is a good place to start. Suad provided a lot of the information, which tied in the Castorena branch with the Leija-Sanchez organization. The ties are pointed out on her site.
Please note that this is a very brief overview of the Suad story and if you are interested, her site covers it in great detail. The problem with counterfeit documents is a tendency to associate them with illegal immigrants trying to make a better life for themselves or teenagers sneaking into bars. The real issue is that they are sold to anyone and used by criminals who have a more sinister intent than to make a better life for themselves or sneak into a bar.
No matter where you stand on the illegal immigrant issue, the fact that the trade is controlled by criminals often leaves those with dreams of a better life open to a wide-array of abuse. This includes being enslaved and forced to commit crimes by the people, who bring them over the border.
Another common misconception is that these documents are being sold exclusively to our Hispanic neighbors to the south. The truth is they are being sold to anyone with the money to buy them. Our southern border has become the preferred route for anyone who wants to illegally enter the United States. All the resources needed to gain entry (illegally) seem to be readily available there.
On Friday, Sara Carter released an article in the Washington Times about the ties between the drug cartels on the border and Hezbollah joining forces to smuggle drugs and humans into the country. Although not mentioned in the story, these people obviously would need documents to set up shop once they cross the border. In fact, in theory at least, they might use them to cross the border.
Because, I found the story interesting, I made contact with Suad Leija’s husband, who told me that he gave this information to Carter a few years ago and pointed out that Lou Dobbs has also covered aspects of this story. Both Carter and Dobbs have covered the Suad story, and interviewed her, personally.
During this conversation, he told me that the specific information given was about an operation he proposed called “Tag.” Tag predated his involvement in the Leija-Sanchez operation and was designed to set up a means to provide documents to people illegally entering the country and then "chip" them so that specific targets could be tracked.
The original intent of the Leija-Sanchez operation was to get the cartel to cooperate in identifying and monitoring potential terrorists coming into the United States, illegally. Tag might have become part of this operation, if it had ever taken place, according to Suad's husband.
He told me the Hezbollah connection was nothing new and confirmed it comes out of the tri-border area in Paraguay, which hosts a large Islamic population. The residents in this area emigrated from Lebanon primarily in the aftermath of 1948 Arab-Israeli and the 1985 Lebanese civil wars.
He also mentioned that, according to Suad, the Islamic immigrants were paying $5,000 each to be brought across the border when the Leija-Sanchez organization was involved. Complete sets of counterfeit documents were included in the deal.
Parts of this story have surfaced before; MSBC did a story on the tri-border area of Paraguay and the Hezbollah connection. This story covers the terrorist financing aspect and potential threat to the United States. Michelle Malkin also did a post on her blog mentioning that FBI director Robert Mueller mentioned Hezbollah members crossing the border in testimony before Congress in 2006. She also mentions Mueller referring to terrorists assuming Hispanic identities and crossing the border, while in Texas in 2007. In October of last year, the Los Angeles Times did a story about Hezbollah laundering the proceeds of Colombian Drug Money. The story mentions that the cocaine being sold was going to the United States and other destinations.
Carter, who covers the border situation on a regular basis, has also done stories on the Mexican military crossing the border in support of drug smugglers and even firing shots at U.S. law enforcement. In one of the stories about this, which I saw on YouTube, Carter stated she got some of this information for the harder working illegal immigrant types. She mentioned that they hide from these groups in order to avoid being victimized by them.
Maybe these hard working illegal types are trying to tell us something?
Even more ominous, was President Obama's recent revelation that Al Qaeda was planning attacks on U.S. soil from their hideouts in the tribal belt in Pakistan. If this is true, the first thing these terrorists will need when they enter our country are counterfeit documents so they can blend in with the rest of us.
If you take a look at any aspect of the insecure situation on our border, counterfeit documents are more than likely involved in one way or another.
After all, it is a known fact that the last time a terrorist attack was carried out on U.S. soil; it was accomplished by individuals who used fake documents to enter the country to commit their dirty deeds on 9-11-2001.
Sunday, March 22, 2009
Symantec Indian Call Center Employee Selling Credit Card Details (Shocking)!
A story of an undercover investigation by the BBC shows how dishonest employees at call centers — who collect plastic payment card details on clients — might be making a little extra pocket change by selling them.
The focus of the BBC story is centered on an Indian call center employee for Symantec Security Corporation stealing payment card information. It is also centered on UK customers, which is understandable given it is the BBC, but the reality is that information is stolen then sold from countries all over the world.
Payment card details are handled by telephone at call centers in a lot of places and the calls come from all over, too. A lot of companies have different tiers (levels of personnel) handling calls, depending on the difficulty or nature of the call. At a lot of major companies, these tiers are located in different centers, which are in different countries. Any call might start in one country and, given the nature of the call, it could be transferred to another center located in another country. Given this, payment card information can be sent and then illicitly recorded over a fairly wide geographical area.
Besides that, dishonest employees are caught on a regular basis in a lot of different places. They don't all necessarily reside in India and call centers there are not the only place payment card information can be compromised. In fact, payment card information can be compromised anywhere (not just call centers) where they are used at a point of sale.
Information crooks are recruited and some think even planted anywhere financial information can be stolen. Even if they are not, payment card details are being bartered in forums on the Internet. It probably wouldn't be very hard to find a place to sell credit/debit card information when all it takes to do it is a click of a mouse.
The BBC story, which aired on video, chronicles an investigative effort by their reporters on the streets of Delhi. In the segment, it shows reporters making contact with the underground broker, who offers them payment card details from "all over the world" for $10-$12, each. It then shows a buy being made and money changing hands.
When the information was checked, it revealed that only one in seven card numbers were actually usable. They were able to trace some of the good numbers to a call center handling Symantec (Norton) products. The story stated that there has only been one successful prosecution in India for this type of crime and that it netted a non-custodial sentence. It also stated that the laws regarding the protection of data are not as stringent as they are in some places. The story mentions that Symantec's official comment was that it was an isolated incident and that the employee was removed.
Since one to seven card details turned out to be real, I guess we can assume the underground broker wasn't being completely honest. I've also seen reports of credit card details being sold for a lot less and you don't have to travel to India to find them.
In November, Symantec — the point of compromise in the story — issued a report on the underground economy, which focused on this very subject. "Credit cards are also typically sold in bulk, with lot sizes from as few as 50 credit cards to as many as 2,000. Common bulk amounts and rates observed by Symantec during this reporting period were 50 credit cards for $40 ($0.80 each), 200 credit cards for $150 ($0.75 each), and 2,000 credit cards for $200 ($0.10 each)," according to the report.
If this report is anywhere near accurate and the BBC was buying card details at $10-$12 each — if only one to seven was good in the Delhi exchange — the BBC was getting ripped off!
According to the 68-page report by Symantec, these details can be bought anywhere that has an Internet connection. Counterfeit instruments (ready to use) are often sent through the mail, too. The information is sold via IRC (Internet relay chat) channels in forums designed to market stolen financial information. Although credit/debit card details seem to dominate the scene, a lot of other information is sold that can be used to commit financial crimes and identity theft in these forums, too.
If you don't want to believe the Symantec report, the FBI took down one of these forums not very long ago. This forum known as Dark Market was responsible for about $70 million in fraud, worldwide. My best guess is that the information in the report is pretty accurate.
Although dishonest insiders are the cause of a portion of it, we should remember that hackers breaking into business systems, phishing, malicious software and even the trash can be sources of stolen information. The places targeted for information can be merchants, restaurants, goverment organizations, charity organizations, universities, medical facilities or anywhere payment card information is used at a point of sale.
Keeping up with all the points of compromise is difficult, but one place that attempts to is the DataLossDB site. Please note that the unknown data breaches are the most lucrative for the criminals behind this activity. Once a breach is discovered, measures are enacted to disable the stolen data.
It can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify the point of compromise in most individual cases. The reason for this is there are too many different places where information might have been stolen from.
Maybe that's the problem, or we are storing and transmitting too much information all over the place? Since everyone is making money by transmitting information, I doubt this practice is going to stop anytime soon. So far as outsourcing, I doubt this is going to stop in the near term, either. Companies save a lot of payroll by outsourcing jobs. Payroll is a big expense for corporations and cutting payroll seems to be in vogue these days.
Nothing is going to change until laws are passed that force everyone making money from this information start doing the right things. This includes laws that prohibit people from being irresponsible (my opinion) to laws that punch the criminals stealing the information where it hurts.
Until then, the rest of us will have to batten down the hatches and weather the storm. I highly recommend making sure your information is protected as well as it can be (there are no guarantees) by protecting your own electronic transmissions. Monitoring financial activity — from your financial statements to information on your credit report and the Internet — is a good idea, too. Of course, while doing this, you need to ensure your electronic transmissions are protected by a reliable vendor and that you aren't paying for protection that you could get for free. Sadly enough, everyone claiming they can protect you isn't necessarily being completely honest, either.
The focus of the BBC story is centered on an Indian call center employee for Symantec Security Corporation stealing payment card information. It is also centered on UK customers, which is understandable given it is the BBC, but the reality is that information is stolen then sold from countries all over the world.
Payment card details are handled by telephone at call centers in a lot of places and the calls come from all over, too. A lot of companies have different tiers (levels of personnel) handling calls, depending on the difficulty or nature of the call. At a lot of major companies, these tiers are located in different centers, which are in different countries. Any call might start in one country and, given the nature of the call, it could be transferred to another center located in another country. Given this, payment card information can be sent and then illicitly recorded over a fairly wide geographical area.
Besides that, dishonest employees are caught on a regular basis in a lot of different places. They don't all necessarily reside in India and call centers there are not the only place payment card information can be compromised. In fact, payment card information can be compromised anywhere (not just call centers) where they are used at a point of sale.
Information crooks are recruited and some think even planted anywhere financial information can be stolen. Even if they are not, payment card details are being bartered in forums on the Internet. It probably wouldn't be very hard to find a place to sell credit/debit card information when all it takes to do it is a click of a mouse.
The BBC story, which aired on video, chronicles an investigative effort by their reporters on the streets of Delhi. In the segment, it shows reporters making contact with the underground broker, who offers them payment card details from "all over the world" for $10-$12, each. It then shows a buy being made and money changing hands.
When the information was checked, it revealed that only one in seven card numbers were actually usable. They were able to trace some of the good numbers to a call center handling Symantec (Norton) products. The story stated that there has only been one successful prosecution in India for this type of crime and that it netted a non-custodial sentence. It also stated that the laws regarding the protection of data are not as stringent as they are in some places. The story mentions that Symantec's official comment was that it was an isolated incident and that the employee was removed.
Since one to seven card details turned out to be real, I guess we can assume the underground broker wasn't being completely honest. I've also seen reports of credit card details being sold for a lot less and you don't have to travel to India to find them.
In November, Symantec — the point of compromise in the story — issued a report on the underground economy, which focused on this very subject. "Credit cards are also typically sold in bulk, with lot sizes from as few as 50 credit cards to as many as 2,000. Common bulk amounts and rates observed by Symantec during this reporting period were 50 credit cards for $40 ($0.80 each), 200 credit cards for $150 ($0.75 each), and 2,000 credit cards for $200 ($0.10 each)," according to the report.
If this report is anywhere near accurate and the BBC was buying card details at $10-$12 each — if only one to seven was good in the Delhi exchange — the BBC was getting ripped off!
According to the 68-page report by Symantec, these details can be bought anywhere that has an Internet connection. Counterfeit instruments (ready to use) are often sent through the mail, too. The information is sold via IRC (Internet relay chat) channels in forums designed to market stolen financial information. Although credit/debit card details seem to dominate the scene, a lot of other information is sold that can be used to commit financial crimes and identity theft in these forums, too.
If you don't want to believe the Symantec report, the FBI took down one of these forums not very long ago. This forum known as Dark Market was responsible for about $70 million in fraud, worldwide. My best guess is that the information in the report is pretty accurate.
Although dishonest insiders are the cause of a portion of it, we should remember that hackers breaking into business systems, phishing, malicious software and even the trash can be sources of stolen information. The places targeted for information can be merchants, restaurants, goverment organizations, charity organizations, universities, medical facilities or anywhere payment card information is used at a point of sale.
Keeping up with all the points of compromise is difficult, but one place that attempts to is the DataLossDB site. Please note that the unknown data breaches are the most lucrative for the criminals behind this activity. Once a breach is discovered, measures are enacted to disable the stolen data.
It can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify the point of compromise in most individual cases. The reason for this is there are too many different places where information might have been stolen from.
Maybe that's the problem, or we are storing and transmitting too much information all over the place? Since everyone is making money by transmitting information, I doubt this practice is going to stop anytime soon. So far as outsourcing, I doubt this is going to stop in the near term, either. Companies save a lot of payroll by outsourcing jobs. Payroll is a big expense for corporations and cutting payroll seems to be in vogue these days.
Nothing is going to change until laws are passed that force everyone making money from this information start doing the right things. This includes laws that prohibit people from being irresponsible (my opinion) to laws that punch the criminals stealing the information where it hurts.
Until then, the rest of us will have to batten down the hatches and weather the storm. I highly recommend making sure your information is protected as well as it can be (there are no guarantees) by protecting your own electronic transmissions. Monitoring financial activity — from your financial statements to information on your credit report and the Internet — is a good idea, too. Of course, while doing this, you need to ensure your electronic transmissions are protected by a reliable vendor and that you aren't paying for protection that you could get for free. Sadly enough, everyone claiming they can protect you isn't necessarily being completely honest, either.
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